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LABOUR MARKET REFORM IN THE USSR: FACT OR FICTION?
Sheila Mamie. 
Department of Economics, 
European University Institute.
Abstract:
One of the problems expected to arise during the Soviet Union’s transition to a market- 
type economy is that of unemployment. This paper examines recent Soviet discussion of 
employment problems, as well as the type of preparation currently being undertaken in 
anticipation of large increases in unemployment. Attempts at reforming the labour market 
during the perestroika period are discussed, as are the existing institutions and legislation 
relating to redundancy-type dismissals.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the IVth World Congress of Soviet and 
























































































































































































The USSR is in the process of deciding how to make, and manage, its transition 
to a market-type economy. With regard to employment and the labour market, this 
transition will imply the end of a system of guaranteed employment, as unprofitable 
enterprises are forced to close down, and others are no longer able to "hoard" superfluous 
workers. For the first time, the Soviet Union is trying to come to terms with and define 
the forms and amount of unemployment which already exist in the country. The legislation 
relating to the economic reform is expected to include a new Employment Act, which will 
set out the type of provision to be made for anticipated large increases in unemployment.
How prepared is the Soviet Union to manage such changes in employment 
practices? How is reallocation to be achieved? Do incentives and mechanisms exist to 
facilitate job changes? Are new policies being designed to ensure a minimum social 
consensus for the economic changes envisaged and to protect certain sections of the 
population? Other Eastern European countries are faced with the similar problems, but the 
lessons for the Soviet Union from this quarter are limited, since the scale and regional 
diversity of the Soviet labour market make it a special and more complex case.
The three main questions addressed in this paper are as follows:
1. Has perestroika so far led to any significant increase in unemployment? Calls for the 
large-scale reallocation of labour, involving 19 million or more employees, have led to 
predictions of increases in frictional unemployment. Recent Soviet discussion of 
unemployment is examined, in order to establish whether reports refer to unemployment
'I am most grateful to Anders Aslund, Silvana Malle and John Micklewright for 




























































































which already existed in the pre-perestroika period or to a new phenomenon, i.e. to 
examine the extent to which current unemployment has been inherited, rather than created, 
by perestroika. The novelty so far may be the open discussion of unemployment, rather 
than any significant increases.
2. Has perestroika been successful in changing patterns of labour utilisation and bringing 
about the reallocation of redundant labour from the main industrial branches of the 
economy to the service sector and consumer goods industries? One of the themes of 
perestroika has been the need to eliminate wasteful use of resources, including labour. 
Since the late 1980s it has frequently been stated that as the industrial branches of the 
economy undergo restructuring, redundant workers will be reallocated to the service sector 
and consumer goods industries, in order both to improve labour utilisation and to improve 
the supply of goods and services to the population. Recent employment data are examined 
to establish whether redeployment patterns have in fact followed such policy statements, 
and whether labour utilisation has become less "wasteful".
3. How prepared is the Soviet Union for any future rise in unemployment? It is important 
to look at the type of labour market which has existed until now in the Soviet Union, at 
past attempts to rationalise and reallocate labour, and at the existing government 
employment institutions and regulations relating to redundancies, in order to establish what 
sort of experience the USSR can draw on when tackling the new problems involved in 
restructuring. An attempt will be made to identify those sections of the population most 
likely to be affected by any future increases in unemployment, and to look at the type of 
provision being made for them.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 deals with past employment policy and the 




























































































unemployment and at recent redeployment policies and patterns; section 4 contains a 
summary of reports on the draft employment act which is currently being prepared; and 




























































































2. The Soviet Labour Market and the Previous Approach to Redundancies.
This section refers to the main features of the labour market which has existed in 
the USSR since the 1950s, and focuses in particular on past attempts to encourage and 
direct labour reallocation through the "releasing" and redeployment of redundant workers, 
from approximately 1966-88. Section 3 will deal with the period 1989-90, when some kind 
of transition to a market economy became inevitable, but when most of the features, 
institutions, and regulations mentioned here remained in place.
2.1 Allocation of Labour
Since the 1950s the labour market in the Soviet Union has been subject to much 
less central control than other aspects of the economy. Workers on the whole find jobs 
independently, and factories/organisations advertise their own vacancies and are responsible 
for their own staff recruitment. In the mid 1980s, circa 85% of all hires took place "at the 
factory gate", i.e. without any form of organised state allocation.1 Workers are also free to 
quit and change jobs, and turnover rates show a high degree of mobility. 2
In theory there has been a commitment to full employment, which is guaranteed 
through the practice of "planning from resources", of creating a sufficient overall number 
of workplaces to employ the working age population. Balances have been drawn up in 
order to plan the matching of manpower and workplaces. In practice, however, the balances 
have been drawn up only at the aggregate level, and regional "balances" have not been 
achieved. There are currently estimated to be 2.8 million job vacancies (first shift) in the 
national economy3, and there are reports of labour shortages in most areas of the country. 
(Approximately 139 million are employed in the national economy; 120 million in the state 




























































































excess manpower and lack of employment opportunities for young people in the Central 
Asian Republics.4
The fact that labour force participation rates could not be expected to increase3, and 
that the number of new entrants to the labour market has been lower than in the previous 
decade, made it unlikely that the "balance" could be achieved by drawing on labour 
"reserves” within the population. However, in the absence of any changes in the economic 
system, this seemed to be the dominant preoccupation of planners in the 1980s. In the 
words of one Soviet commentator:
"the sense of employment policy has in essence amounted to meeting the 
demand of the economy for manpower, looking for new sources of 
manpower."6
This meant, for example, that pensioners were given incentives to continue working, that 
only very limited possibilities of part-time and home-based work were offered, and that 
further expansion of full time study was discouraged. Any healthy adult was obliged to 
work for all of his/her adult life; the choice not to work did not exist.7
In this context the term used for "unemployed" (nezaniatve') meant those not 
employed in the state economy, who were looked upon as potential "reserves" which 
should in some way be "drawn in" to the state sector.8 The question of whether the 
nezaniatve were actively seeking employment in the state sector was not usually raised.9
Thus the dominant concern of the last 20 years has been that of finding additional 
manpower at all costs, which does not suggest that the USSR has much expertise to draw 
on now, when faced with the task of devising suitable labour market policies for the 
proposed structural changes.
2.2 The Previous Approach to Redundancies.




























































































2% in the 1970s; 4% per year planned for 12th five year plan, 1986-90 10), there has 
always been the idea that they were inevitable if the economy were to be restructured, and 
that they should and could be carried out in a "planned manner". Even those specialists 
who criticised the planners one-sided view of the worker as a "labour resource", a resource 
to be planned like any other input, rather than something more human, seemed to believe 
that the way to protect the social rights of workers, was to plan the elimination of 
uninteresting low-skill jobs and the redeployment of released workers, thus avoiding 
unemployment.11 There has long been a contradiction between the usual calls for less 
planning as a way to improve the working of the economy, and the calls of most Soviet 
labour specialists for more planning of labour allocation, in order to combat hoarding and 
to avoid unnecessarily long spells of open frictional unemployment.12 The calls for more 
planning have stemmed largely from a reluctance to admit to any form of unemployment, 
because of the important legitimation role played by full employment in Soviet politics; 
but also to a firmly embedded traditional Soviet principle that unplanned individual 
mobility is wasteful and should be discouraged.13
2.3 Redundancy Dismissals and Planning
For over twenty years Soviet specialists have pointed to the hoarding of workers 
in Soviet enterprises, and stressed the need to find some mechanism to ensure the 
"releasing" of superfluous workers and their redeployment in more productive jobs. The 
number of superfluous workers was commonly said to represent 15-20% of an enterprise’s 
workforce 14. In order to do this either an effective incentive had to be given to managers 
to "release" workers, or planners had to gain more information on actual enterprise 
manpower requirements in order either to set releasing targets or limit the enterprise’s 




























































































output target: the amount of labour required for the fulfillment of the output target was 
based on the amount required in the previous plan period with some allowance for planned 
productivity increases. Throughout the 1970s and ’80s experiments based on the example 
of "Shchekino" were used to try and offer enterprises incentives to release workers.15 
Schemes such as "attestation" of workplaces were used to try and collect information on 
enterprise manpower requirements.16 Most recently the 1986 wage reform was an attempt 
to give enterprises an incentive to rationalise, by increasing the centrally-set wage tariffs 
for all categories of workers, but asking enterprises to finance the increases out of their 
own funds.17 The 1987 Enterprise Law also offered enterprises two types of self-accounting 
models, the second of which offered the enterprises the chance to benefit from reducing 
their workforce.18
Releasing entered the planning vocabulary, and targets for releasing manual labour 
were included in the enterprises’ plans. Various adjectives were used to describe what are 
apparently different forms of releasing, namely "relative freeing", "conditional freeing" and 
"absolute freeing." These were, however, terms used above all in the technical planning 
literature, and did not necessarily correspond to actual workers being made redundant. The 
planning system was geared towards the production of increasing volumes of output, and 
the concept of labour releasing has until now been part of output planning, not employment 
policy. In this context the concept of labour releasing has referred to productivity growth 
measured in higher volumes of output per unit of labour or labour time. Current reports 
of x-numbers of released workers still do not correspond to a number of dismissed 
workers, but to a productivity increase, relative to a previous productivity level, calculated 
in terms of labour, with productivity gains being the result of increasing output, rather than 
decreasing labour expenditure.19 Worker requirements were estimated as the equivalent of 




























































































numbers of workers is reduced, (although actual employment levels may be reduced by 
non-replacement of retired workers) and the planning of potential unemployment has had 
little to do with actual people and their welfare.20
2.4. Redundancy Dismissals and the Law
According to the Soviet Constitution, citizens have the right and duty to work. The 
state has the reponsibility of providing workplaces. However, responsibility for finding 
alternative employment for released workers has until now rested with the enterprise. This 
has been consistently quoted by Soviet specialists as a major disincentive for enterprises 
to release their surplus manpower.21 They have usually advocated that the state assume 
responsiblity for redeployment through the network of labour offices (see below) under the 
State Committee for Labour and Social Questions.
There has always been legislation which foresaw the possiblity of redundancy-type 
dismissals. The Labour Code has allowed managers to dismiss workers in connection with 
"liquidation of the enterprise, institution, organisation, reduction in the number or 
composition of staff'.22 Before a manager could dismiss a worker due to reduction in 
numbers employed, the worker has had to be offered an alternative job within the same 
enterprise, or management has had to prove that no alternative exists. In the case of 
liquidation, the ’higher standing body’, i.e. the Ministry in the case of industrial enterprises, 
and the job placement bodies have had to solve the problem of job placement of the 
released workers.23 Should the worker not accept the alternative job, or if there is no 
alternative to be offered, the dismissal procedure (uvoTnenie) has been used. (Workers 
refusing the alternative may also quit, without waiting to be dismissed. They have then 
come under the voluntary quit category tekuchesf. which covers voluntary quits and 




























































































has been required for dismissal and the work contract has had to be terminated no later 
than one month after the trade union approval has been given.
A new version of the Labour Code was published in 1988“ . The above regulations 
remain valid, but there is a new section specifically dedicated to "Guaranteeing 
Employment for Released Workers”, spelling out the rights of released workers and the 
procedure for releasing. (Labour Code, Chap.III-A, Art.40). The offer of alternative 
employment is now expressly cited as the means of guaranteeing the released worker the 
right to work.26 The worker has to be given 2 months’ notice, and in the case of reduction 
in staff numbers, has to be offered an alternative job by management within the same 
enterprise at the same time as notice is served. If work is not available in the same 
profession or specialisation, or if the worker refuses transfer (perevod) to another job 
within the same enterprise, he may be placed through a Job Placement Buro (henceforth 
JPB) or find work independently. Management informs the Job Placement Organs of the 
releasing envisaged, with information on the job skills and pay level of the workers 
involved. A type of unemployment benefit has been introduced: the worker is given a 
severance payment of one month’s average pay, and is guaranteed a maximum of 2 
months’ pay (including the severance payment) inbetween jobs (3 months’ pay in the case 
of liquidation and if workers register with a JPB within two weeks of being dismissed). 
These payments are made by the enterprise where he was originally employed. He loses 
his uninterrupted work service record (stazh: important for for entitlement to pension 
supplements, extra vacation and other benefits) if he does not start another job within 3 
months.
Regulations on reundancy dismissals exist in many Western European countries27, 
and Soviet specialists may have exaggerated the role of this legal disincentive to 




























































































regulations were never actually put to the test). However, the reluctance of the state until 
now to assume responsibility for redeployment and unemployment benefit does seem to 
have run contrary to the policy statements on the need to release and redeploy millions of 
workers. The 1988 Labour Code gives managers more rights with regard to reallocation of 
the workforce within the enterprise (arts 25 and 29), and until 1988-89 policy statements, 
including one by Gorbachev, contained assurances that unemployment would not be 
tolerated in the Soviet Union. This suggests that until approximately one year ago, it was 
hoped to follow the East German example of encouraging enterprises to rationalise, while 
redeploying and retraining workers internally.
2.5 Institutions in the Soviet Labour Market
Job Placement Buros (JPBs) were first established in 1969 in the RSFSR.28 They 
have been under the jurisdiction of either the Republic State Labour Committee or the 
local labour "organs" attached to the local government. They were first set up to help 
after the 1965 Economic Reform when enterprises were expected to release workers, who 
would need help in redeployment. Such large-scale releasing never occured. Since then the 
JPBs have grown in number, and at the end of 1989 there were reported to be 812 job 
placement centres and over 2,000 buros (and filiali).29
There has always been some ambiguity surrounding their exact status and functions: 
they could be designed to help workers with their independent job search, or they could 
be seen as agents through which the state could try and increase its control over both 
worker mobility (discourage voluntary "unplanned" quits) and enterprise demand30. Such 
ambiguity is still inevitable as long as employment policy remains caught between the 





























































































Both the 1988 Labour Code and a 1988 Resolution31 suggested that they should be 
expanded and take over the main responsibility for redeployment of released workers. 
These buros have, however, always been understaffed and poorly financed. (Until now most 
of their financing has come from fees charged to enterprises for use of their services.32) 
The wage of a JPB employee is reported to be lower than the national average, and it is 
difficult to find qualified staff to work in them.33 Financially they have been dependent on 
the local enterprises and local government authorities. They are still not computerised. On 
the whole they are looked on with suspicion by workers, and only those who have great 
difficulty in finding work independently register with them. (Women and elderly who 
would like part time or home-based work; former prisoners; school leavers with poor 
school records, etc). Enterprises are likewise uninterested in taking on the type of workers 
which tend to be send to them by the buros.34 (They have never been obliged to employ 
a worker sent by the JPB, nor has the worker been obliged to accept the job.) Since 1988 
enterprises have been required to register all vacancies with the JPBs, but one article 
suggests that they only register those which are difficult to fill.33
It is usually suggested that state employment offices should also organise and 
coordinate retraining programmes for released workers. At present most retraining is 
organised by the enterprises. Job security and legal disincentives to release workers may 
have acted as an incentive to enterprises to retrain their own workforce, especially since 
the legal regulations on redeployment within the enterprise have been much laxer. 
However, another aspect of inefficient utilisation of labour in the USSR has been the fact 
that obsolete machinery is not scrapped. Workers have been kept working at low- 
productivity machinery, which in turn requires more workers for repair work.36 There is a 
shortage of skilled workers to operate more sophisticated machinery and one of the causes 




























































































workers (about 5 % of those employed in the state sector) were given training or retraining 
at their place of work, but the number had actually decreased from 7.9 million in 1980.38
Thus, if this skeleton institutional framework is to provide the foundation for a 
network of state employment agencies, there is no sign that it is prepared for such a task. 
Since it is the unskilled workers who are likely to be released first, state retraining centres 
and schemes would seem necessary. Apart from good intentions expressed in the 1988 





























































































3.Recent Discussion of Unemployment and Redeployment
3.1 Existing Forms of Unemployment.
Since 1988 there have been some attempts to come to terms with and define the 
existing forms of unemployment. There has been mention of seasonal unemployment in 
agriculture and summer tourist resorts’9; of school leavers having difficulty finding jobs"; 
and particularly of a growing unemployment problem in the Central Asian republics. In 
1989 a figure of 13 million, was given for the "nezaniatve" working-age population, those 
not in state employment41; in August 1990, 8 million were reported to be nezaniatve. in 
that they were unemployed due to the seasonal character of their work, were inbetween 
jobs, were invalids (Group III), housewives, or refused to engage in "socially useful 
labour"42. Figures of 4-6 million were given as estimates of unemployed (bezrabotitsa). 
those who are not in state employment but who could be, with half of these living in 
Central Asia and Kazakhstan. More recently we have been given a figure of 2 million43, 
which is an estimate of the State Committee for Labour and Social Questions 
(Goskomtrud). This estimate is the first to allow for an element of voluntary 
unemployment: it refers to those of working age, who are able to work, and who are 
actively looking for work. Most of these again are thought to be in Central Asia, but it is 
not clear on what basis such statistics are calculated, and Soviet specialists complain about 
the lack of data available.44
It should be stressed, however, that all these forms of unemployment have been 
inherited by perestroika. The rise in frictional unemployment which should occur due to 
restructuring and rationalisation of the use of labour is still only a prediction. There have, 
however, been continuous forecasts of 13-19 million workers from the "material production 
sector" having to change jobs by the year 2000.45 Here again the novelty is the "having 




























































































jobs every year, and turnover levels have always been high. The situation will only become 
more serious in terms of unemployment if enterprises really have to cut back their demand. 
Presently demand for additional labour remains high and appears to be growing: the 
number of vacancies (first shift) is reported to have risen from 1.5 million in 1989, to 2.8 
million in 1990.“
There is also evidence that a large section of the population is involved in second 
economy activities, and that private income from such activities can represent from 15-6- 
% of total personal income.41 Most of those involved in the second economy, however, 
combine these activities with state employment; private income supplements the state wage. 
It is possible that some of those now being categorised as unemployed will have some 
alternative unofficial sources of income. Should workers be shed from the state sector, it 
is also possible that second economy activities will provide some people with either initial 
cushioning, or with immediate access to legitimised private economy employment. 
However, current private income earnings vary greatly according to city, region, family, 
skill, etc., and cannot always be expected to provide ready sources of alternative 
employment.
3.2 Redeployment Strategies
Policy statements have suggested that workers will be redeployed in the 
underdeveloped service sector and the consumer goods industry. In the last 2 years the 
number employed in the state industrial sector has begun to decline, (in 1988 the number 
working in the production branches of the state sector decreased by 1.5 million, 1.2%®; in 
1989 state sector employment decreased by 1.3 million, 1%; see Appendix 1). This 
decrease is largely due to the wage reform (see p6 above); in 1989 circa 1.5 million were 




























































































this figure also probably includes vacancies which were scrapped. See Appendix 5) 
Employment in some areas of the state service sector, such as health and education, did 
increase in these years, but not to any dramatic extent. There was a decrease in 
employment in housing and everyday services from 1988-89 (-0.55%) and in light industry 
(-4.23%), whereas policy statements suggest increases were to be expected. (See Appendix 
2) Wages in both these sectors are still relatively low (Appendix 3), although the average 
wage in light industry increased by 11.7% from 1987-88, compared to 8.5% for industry 
as a whole. Under the present arrangements workers in these sectors still have less access 
to housing, medical services, and other perks allocated through the place of work (holiday 
homes, sport and leisure facilities etc.)
Since 1986 there have been two new forms of employment in the USSR: 
cooperatives and private individual activity. The wording of the 1988 law on cooperatives49 
suggests that they were designed to help develope the consumer goods industry and service 
sector, and that they were envisaged as alternative employment in the consumer goods and 
service sectors for workers released from state enterprises in the period of restructuring, 
but also as sources of employment for "additional” labour resources, either for those not 
in state employment, i.e. pensioners, housewives, etc., or those already in state 
employment: employees of state enterprises can take on coop jobs as a form of second 
employment (soymestiteTstvo). This again reflects the constant ambivalence in employment 
policies: on the one hand the need to rationalise is stressed, and on the other, the inability 
to reduce labour demand means that "reserves” are continually sought.
The numbers employed in coops have risen dramatically: from 155,800 in January 





























































































% of workforce employed by state, by cooperatives, in individual work
State Coops Ind.Work












* does not include sovmestiterstvo. people combining state and coop jobs.
** sovmestiterstvo included.
Trud v SSSR. pp274-276; Ekonomika i zhizn’. no.6 1990; Argumentv i faktv. no.45, 1989; 
Vestnik statistiki. no.4 1989; Statisticheskii Press Biulleten’ nolO and no5, 1989; 
Ekonomika i zhizn’. no. 18, 1990
Given that state enterprises have failed to rationalise labour and that overall demand 
for labour remains high, coops may be competing with enterprises for scarce labour 
resources, rather than offering alternative employment to released workers. Despite the fact 
that 1.3 million workers were released from state production enterprises in 1989, 
employment in material production rose by 0.1% (circa 86,000) due to the increase in 
coops.50 Coops offer high wages and attract particularly skilled workers.51 In January 1989 
two thirds of those working in coops or individual work had either transferred from state 
enterprises and organisations or were combining the cooperative job with a state job.52 In 
1989 about 80% of all coops were set up alongside state enterprises. About 60% of all 
fixed assets possessed by coops are leased from state enterprises, and they buy more than 
60% of supplies from enterprises.53 In the past, with releasing schemes of the Shchekino 
type, released workers tended to be used to man new workplaces within the same 




























































































be continuing, with enterprises formally releasing workers, but using coop labour to help 
make better use of enterprise capacity, and to fulfill state orders. Such practice will not 
lead to more efficient utilisation of labour resources, nor to the promised redeployment of 
labour to the service sector.
Recently there have been regulations limiting the scale and scope of their activities 
which would seem to go against the idea of developing the comsumer goods and service 
sectors and of easing the redeployment process. As a result of such regulations the number 
of cooperatives in trade and catering has decreased. One third of cooperative workers are 
currently employed in construction, and only one in six in consumer goods industry, and 
one in eight in the service sphere.54 (See Appendix 4)
3.3 Which sections of the workforce are threatened by unemployment?
According to one Soviet sociologist:
"A new fringe stratum is appearing in our society, consisting of people
squeezed from production....This stratum is made up of non-specialist white-
collar workers, unskilled blue-collar workers, people approaching pension age 
and young people about to enter the workforce."55
Such statements, however, are still predictions; for the moment the labour market remains
taut. Should other changes in the economy take place, unemployment may be a problem.
At the moment any unemployment is minimal and has been inherited from the past. The
groups mentioned in the Soviet articles are women and young people, and unskilled,
particularly elderly unskilled workers.56
There is potentially a problem with the redeployment of white-collar workers in 
large towns, this section of the workforce being the target of separate releasing campaigns 
to reduce administrative staff. In Moscow in April 1988 there were 101,842 vacancies, but 
only 12,000 were for "engineering and technical s ta ff (ITRs) and other white collar 




























































































then 14,000 for white collar workers.57 Thus those released due to the streamlining of the 
state apparatus may have to look for work outside Moscow.58 Recent reports suggest that 
so far the problem has not arisen, as administrative staff subject to rationalisation measures 
appear to have been reshuffled into other administrative jobs, and the reduction in the 
average annual employment figures for this category (Appendix 2) is largely due to the re­
categorisation of some of their jobs under "production".59
The data on releasing after the wage reform show that a high percentage of those 
released and leaving the enterprise, actually retired, (see Appendix 5: about 30% of those 
released from enterprise retired.) This suggests that people of pensionable age after years 
of being encouraged to continue in employment after retirement age (55 for women; 60 for 
men)60, are now the first to be asked to leave. The Soviet population is aging, and old age 
pensioners currently represent 17.1% of the population. By the end of 1990, pension age 
citizens will number 51 million.61 The growth in the older age groups took place above 
all in the European parts of the country. (In the Central Asian Republics the pension age 
group represents 8-10% of the population.)62 Since January 1990 workers and foremen who 
continue to work beyond retirement age have the right to receive their full pension, no 
matter how high their earnings63, and in May 1990 this right was extended to all categories 
of employees.64 (Previously there was a ceiling for most retirement age employees on the 
total amount that could be received per month by combining wage and pension; they could 
also receive a supplement of approximately 40 roubles to their pension on retirement 
instead of receiving their pension while still in employment.) The current situation of 
labour shortage in the European parts of the country should ensure that a certain proportion 
of pensioners benefit from such measures, but since the previous ceiling on combined 
pension and wage was 300 roubles per month65, these new regulations will benefit those 




























































































there may still be an increase in poverty among this age group. The average pension for 
workers and employers in 1988 was only 40% of the average wage for these categories. 
(Average wage was 217 roubles; average pension 86.3 roubles). The minimum pension is 
now 70 roubles.66 It is not always clear that whether pensioners want to, or have to 
continue working for financial reasons. The table below shows that about 40% received a 
pension of below 80 roubles in 1988.
TABLE 2
Average monthly old age pension (roubles!
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988
71.6 87.2 89.4 91.7 93.9
Size of old- age pension . Julv 1987 ("roubles ner month!
up to60 60-80 80-100 100-120 more or=120
% of all 
old age 
pensioners 
receiving 20.2 21.3 17 13.1 28.4
size of monthly family income for pensioners*, vear unspecified (published 19901
up to 50 50-75 75-100 100-150 150+




3.6 28.7 27.8 29.2 10.7
*old-age pensioners represent about 75% of all pensioners
Statisticheskii Press Biulleten’ no.l and no.9 1989 Ekonomika i zhizn’ no.18, 1990
In the same year, there were 10 million old age pensioners working in the state 
economy, only 400,000 of whom had part time work.67 Of these 35% were workers who 
had a right to premature retirement, who may be younger and more predisposed and able 
to continue work. However, 13% of the male working pensioners were over 70 years old, 
and 19% of the female working pensioners were over 65 “ One fifth of the 41 million said 
to have an income below the minimum wage level are pensioners (but not just old age 




























































































between those pensioners who work and those who live off their pension. 
TABLE 3







w ith pension 
USSR
Total income 280 107 102
of which




food 94 56 56
non-food products 61 22 22
services 32 19 12
savings 39 3 -0.6
* where pensioners do not work for more than 2 months per year 
Ekonomika i zhizn’. no. 18, 1990
This section of the population seem likely to suffer if there is a wave of releasing 
coupled with price rises, unless the recent law (May 1990) on pensions succeeds in 
providing some sort of cushion for them.
3.4 The Regional Aspect
Reports on unemployment frequently refer to Central Asia. Here the problem is 
different, in that the concern is not with finding redeployment solutions for released 
workers, but with creating jobs particularly for the young. This again is not an 
unemployment problem which is due to any innovations introduced under perestroika, but 
rather one which stems from the past inability of the planning system to coordinate 
population forecasts, investment plans, and productivity targets.
There have been references to mass poverty in Central Asia, with one report 




























































































60% in Tadzhikistan; over 46% in Uzbekistan; 40% in Kighizia and Turkmenistan. It is 
claimed that the average income in the region is 40-60 roubles and that one of the causes 
of poverty is "mass unemployment".70 Such reports may be a little over-dramatic. Some of 
this area is rich in agricultural terms, and more information is needed on unofficial income. 
Another article suggests that the feudal-type social and economic relations, rather than 
unemployment, may account for much of the poverty in some of these Republics.71
It is difficult to estimate the extent of unemployment in this region. A 1987 
resolution on Central Asia and the Caucases published last year refers to over 5 million 
nezaniatve.”  A similar resolution dated 1986 states that there is a real reserve of 3 million 
from the able-bodied population which could be drawn into social production 73, of whom 
1 million in Uzbekistan and 0.4 million in Azerbaidzhan; about 1 million, more than one 
third, are men. Women with many children are said to represent less than one fifth and 
more than half of them would like to work under certain conditions.74 This resolution 
gives the percentage of the working age population which was nezaniatve in some of the 






































































































of which 94% female 582610
Turkmenia 18.8% 329247






(% of working age population is in 1984; estimated number of nezaniatve calculated from 
1989 figures for working age population)
"real reserves" of nezaniatve 3,000,000
male 1,000,000
female 2,000,000
females with many children 600,000
females with many children wishing to work 300,000
other female 1,400,000
"real reserves" in Uzbekistan 1,000,000
unemployed school leavers 8,600
working age pop in Uzbekistan 9,719,685
reserves as % of working age pop 10.2%
"real reserves" in Azerbaidzhan 400,000
working age pop in Azerbaidzhan 3,888,091
reserves as % of working age pop 10.2%
Vestnik statistiki. no.5 1990; Izvestiia TsK KPSS no.5 1989; Argumentv i faktv. no.45, 
1989
If we discount the women with many children who do not wish to work (even 
those wishing to work, wish to do so only "under certain circumstances"; i.e. if work is 




























































































able-bodied population in 1989. We know that in at least two of the republics, Tadzhikistan 
and Turkmenia, the percentage of female nezaniatve is extremely high; the number of 
males not in state employment is roughly 38,000 and 6,500 respectively. It is not clear that 
cultural reasons would permit married women to work outside the domain of the home and 
private plot. The above resolutions should, moreover, be seen in the context of the 
planners’ obsession with finding "reserves" which could be drawn into social production. 
They mention frequently that a significant proportion of these nezaniatve are parasites 
living of illegal income, which suggests that some voluntarily choose to remain outside 
state employment.
Young workers in Central Asia are said to have problems finding jobs. It is reported 
that in Uzbekistan in 1985 only 7% of school leavers from rural schools were placed in 
industry and 6% in construction.75 In Uzbekistan in the 11th Five year Plan (1981-85), 19% 
of the graduates of universities (vuz) and 39% of secondary specialised institutes (suz); 
more than half of teachers were not allocated jobs.76 Recent statistics show that 7.7% of 
all Soviet school leavers found jobs in agriculture in 1974, but 42% in 1987,77 This must 
be due to the fact that almost all the new entrants to the labour force are now in the 
Central Asia Republics, where the rural population is still large, and suggests that young 
people are working in agriculture, either from choice or necessity. The following table 
shows that there has been a considerable increase in the number of school leavers not 






























































































School leavers in Central Asia
Age 16-17 Age 18-19 school leavers
1989 1989 not in employment
1985 1987 % of 16-17 yrs 
in 1987
Uzbekistan 823244 757554 4300 8600 1.1%
Tadzhikistan 216239 200278 3400 4300 2.1%
Turkmenia 144468 145519 1500 2700 1.8%
Kirgizia 168808 152445 900 1500 0.9%
Kazakhstan 589418 551070 1800 2600 0.4%
RSFSR 4052661 3903984 5500 7100 0.1%
USSR 8691747 8238167 29900 36200 0%
Vestnik statistiki no.5 1990; Trud v SSSR. Moscow 1988, p93; Molodezh’ SSSR. 
Goskomstat 1990, p i40.
Evidence on unemployment in Central Asia is inconclusive. Other attempts to 
rationalise may have served to increase involuntary unemployment in this area: investment 
has been cut back, which means that there may be less new workplaces being created for 
the young generation; releasing campaigns are said to have been carried out in this area, 
thus contradicting other calls to increase the numbers employed in the state economy.78 
However more knowledge is needed on the extent of involuntary unemployment is required 




























































































4. New Employment Act
A new employment act ("Basic Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics on 
Employment of the Population") is being prepared as part of the legislation announcing the 
introduction of economic reform” . For the first time the legislation being considered 
recognises unemployment and envisages state responsibility and provision for the 
unemployed. Reports suggest that the main points to be included in this legislation are as 
follows:
(i) citizens should have the right to choose whether to work or not. Bringing up children 
and looking after the elderly or invalids should be recognised as a valid form of 
employment, and by means of social guarantees their prestige should be raised. Citizens 
should have the right not to work, provided they have a legal source of income.
(ii) the state cannot retain a monopoly over labour resources. Workers have the right to 
choose to work for organisations outside state employment (cooperatives, leasing and 
shareholder enterprises, private farmers)
(iii) Anyone of working age who is able to work, and actively seeks work, but cannot find 
employment, is to be considered unemployed (bezrabotnvi). and will be entitled to a 
benefit. The proposal for the moment is that the central government guarantees a minimum 
level of benefit; this would be a minimum wage (70-80 roubles, Trud v SSSR. pp227- 
228) for those who previously worked at socialist enterprises and have lost their jobs, for 
those who are demobilised from the armed forces, and for those who have just finished 
training. The other unemployed, including first time job seekers, would be given 50% of 
the minimum pension (35 roubles80 ). Republics and autonomous republics can use their 
own funds to supplement the minimum benefit. This benefit would be paid for 6 months, 
after which, if the worker has not found employment, he will be offered a wage to do 




























































































minimum wage for the duration of the course.
(iv) the state should take on full responsibility for employment services. The state and not 
the enterprise should be responsible for job placement of released workers. The existing 
job placement buros and centres should be re-organised, and funded by the state, not by 
enterprises. The state network of employment services should be responsible for job 
placement, career advice, training and retraining.
(v) the centre should still draw up programmes to help with employment problems of 
women, young people, people near retirement age, invalids, certain territorial units.
(vi) there is also a proposal to set up an employment fund to help finance the benefits and 
employment services, contributions to which would come from a special enterprise tax, and 
possibly from a voluntary social insurance.
Point (i) acknowledges for the first time that employment and unemployment may 
be voluntary; point (ii) that employment does not mean state employment. Point (iii) gives 
the embryo of a state unemployment benefit scheme, although the proposed payments seem 
very low, especially for new entrants. Point (iv) recognises state responsibility for helping 
in the redeployment of unemployed workers, but there is still no clear picture of how the 
proposed state system will differ from the current placement service.
The significance of this legislation may be primarily symbolic, in that unemployment 
is recognised as a problem for which state provision should be made. It should herald the 
end of the previous criminalisation of unemployment, whereby the non-employed were 
classified (and sometimes arrested) as "parasites". In practical terms little support is offered 
to the long term unemployed, in that the type of benefit proposed falls short of the 
schemes currently being implemented in other Eastern European countries81. Unless the 




























































































severance payment made by the enterprise (2-3 months of previous average wage) will 





























































































There has been some speculation that economic restructuring would lead to large- 
scale labour reallocation, and consequently to a significant increase in unemployment in the 
USSR. So far there is no evidence of either phenomenon. What there has been is an 
increase in the discussion of unemployment, as well as attempts to define the existing 
types of unemployment. There has long been evidence of frictional and seasonal 
unemployment in the Soviet Union, (although the amount of such unemployment has never 
been alarming, it was never admitted to in the days when any mention of unemployment 
was taboo), and for some time there have been reports of unemployment in the Central 
Asian Republics. Here it is difficult to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
unemployment, because the only data published so far refer to all those not employed in 
the state sector, whether seeking state employment or not. The main point about such cases 
of unemployment, however, is that they are not new, although it is possible that attempts 
at rationalisation have made matters worse.
Perestroika promised to encourage the more rational use of resources, including 
labour, and to promote the reallocation of redundant workers from the main industrial 
branches of the economy to the service sphere and consumer goods industries. While there 
has been some decrease in annual average employment in material production since 1988, 
much of this is due to the wage reform, and does not represent any permanent change in 
the pattern of labour utilisation. Cooperatives were supposed to provide an alternative 
source of employment for workers released from state enterprises, and to help develope the 
service sphere and consumer goods production. I have argued, however, that cooperatives 
have become an additional rather than an alternative source of employment, with demand 
in the state sector remaining high. Moreover, the majority of cooperative workers are 




























































































Past employment policies and the previous approach to redundancies have left the 
Soviet Union with very little experience on which to draw when tackling current labour 
market problems. Employment policy has been dominated by the need to find additional 
labour resources for the state sector, and enterprises have been encouraged to redeploy 
redundant workers internally, in order to avoid the question of open unemployment. In 
practical terms the past experience of redundancy-type dismissals is almost non-existent. 
A skeleton legislative and institutional framework does exist, but institutions in particular 
require a vast amount of human and financial investment. Soviet attitudes to the problems 
of the unemployed point to a lack of intellectual preparation for labour market reform. 
Some refuse to consider the problems, insisting that unemployment is incompatible with 
socialism, and must not be tolerated; that investment policy can be planned to avoid it.82 
Others insist that unemployment will not be a problem, because of the underdeveloped 
service sector and the need to expand the production of consumer goods.85 Some do, 
however, recognise that it may be a problem automatically transforming lathe turners and 
fitters into hairdressers and cooks.84
There is evidence that about 30% of all those made redundant due to the wage 
reform, and who had to leave the enterprise, actually retired. This suggests firstly 
redundancies do not necessarily lead to increased mobility and reallocation, and secondly 
that pensioners will be one of the first sections of the population to suffer from involuntary 
unemployment.
The draft Employment Act currently under discussion represents the first serious 
attempt at tackling changing patterns of employment and unemployment. So far, however, 
there has been more fiction than fact surrounding labour market reform in the Soviet 




























































































Total labour resources 
(population in working age minus invalids 
in Groups I+II and pensioners in working 
age group, plus people older and younger 
than working age employed in the economy)
of which
able-bodied in working age group 
workers older than retirement age 





in coops (full time)
in personal subsidiary economy
individual employment
full time students
those not in state or other forms of employment
("nezaniatye")
of which
women at home with children 
military service
temporary unemployed and Group III invalids 
Foreign workers














































































































APPENDIX 2. Percentage increase in Annual Average No. of Workers and Employees 
employed by State
1985 - 1986 1986 - 1987 1987 - 1988
Material production
Industry 0.31 -0.21 -2.0
communications -0.9 -3.0 -3.5
construction 1.45 2.53 6.61




computer services 29.56 12.1 -3.0
others 1.48 3.77 2.0
Agriculture 
sovkhoz and -1.55 -0.58 -2.77
agr.enterprises
forestry -0.44 -2.2 -4.73
kolkhoz - 1.0 -2.58 -4.38
Non-material production
housing and 
everyday services 2.0 1.24 -0.55
health 1.49 3.0 2.8
education 2.3 3.0 3.0
culture 2.16 3.67 4.36
art 0.43 1.3 1.5
sc. and sc.services -0.17 -3.9 -3.95
credit and insurance -1.32 0.6 0.3
admin.staff -0.58 -16.3* -9.6*
All Industry 0.31 -0.21 -2.0
Heavy Industry 0.6 -0.3 -1.84
Fuel Energy Complex 0.72 -1.2 -0.6
Metallurgy Complex 0.04 -1.5 -2.76
Mach-Bldg Complex 0.7 -0.2 -1.76
Chem-Wood Complex 0.06 -0.72 -2.14
Light Industry -0.66 -0.45 -4.23
Food Industry -0.8 - 0.1 -0.56
* 0.4 million workers reclassified
Calculated from Trud v SSSR pp30-31, p49, pp76-77; Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1988a 
pp34-35. p366.
(Material production refers to industry, construction, agriculture, transport, and aspects of 





























































































APPENDIX 3. Average Monthly Wage (roubles)
1985 1986 1987 1988
All Industry 210.6 215.7 221.9 240.8
Heavv Industry 220.4 225.7 231.6 250.7
Fuel Enerev Complex 279.4 284.5 294.7 318.5
Electric energy 210 216.6 226 251
Fuel Industry 313 317.8 329.2 352.4
Metallurgy ComDlex 257.7 264.5 271.1 296.9
Mach-Blde Comdex 214.4 219 224 241.3
Chem.Wood Complex 212.1 219.2 224.2 243.2
Light Industry 167.5 170.4 174.4 194.8
Textile 178.3 181.2 185 205.9
Knitwear 
Leather, Fur
150.2 153.4 157.9 177.3
Footwear 184.3 186.9 190.6 212.7
Food Ind 188.4 194 206.3 219
Food preparation 162.4 166.3 180.7 191.2
Meat and Dairy 176.5 182.8 189.6 201.9
Fish Industry 342.6 353.7 373.7 400.9
Construction 236.6 244.6 257.2 288.9
Transport 220.3 228.1 239.4 260.1
Communications 159.5 164 175.1 196.4
Trade Catering
Supply 149.2 152.9 155.7 165.1
Computer Services 
Housing and other
143.3 158 165.6 183.8
services 146.6 149.3 154.4 168
Health 132.8 134.9 143.3 152.5
Education 150 155.7 165.6 171.4
Culture 117.3 118.1 121.6 128.2
Art 145.3 147.8 151 155.1
Sc.and Sc. services 202.4 208.2 217.4 248.4
Credit and Insurance 180.9 190.9 198.6 206.4
Admin Staff 168.8 176.6 187.8 203.9
(Average wage of coop workers 1989 = 500 roubles; including those combining coop job 
with other form of employment, Ekonomika i zhizn’. no.6 1990)




























































































APPENDIX 4. Type of coop activity
No.of coops No. working
(thousands) in them 
(thousands)
total 193.4 4,851.5
consumer goods 33.7 793.2
public catering 5.6 53.4
selling 1.2 14.3
buying and selling 6.4 67.9
public services 
storing and processing 










research design and 
development of programmes
3.1 114.5
and information services 10.4 320.1
agriculture 8.4 98.8
medical services 3.3 61.2
art design 4.5 74.1
leisure services 2.6 53.2
others 39.3 1,024.9




























































































APPENDIX 5. Releasing due to Introduction of New Pay Regulations 
1 July 1988 and 1989 (thousands)
1988
No. of workers released (inc.vacancies)
1989
all enterorises in Drod. branches 2321 3172
no. redeployed in same enterprise 821 1166
no. redeployed in 2nd/3rd shift 141 199
no. released from enterprise 1197 (51%) 1580 (49%)
of whom no. retired 359 (30%) 486 (30%)
No. of workers released (inc.vacancies)
all enterprises in industry 910 1364
no. redeployed in same enterprise 417 605
no. redeployed in 2nd/3rd shift 110 156
no. released from enterprise 362 (39%) 551 (40%)
of whom no. retired 144 (39%) 220 (39%)
No. of workers released (inc.vacancies)
all enterorises in agriculture 125 253
no. redeployed in same enterprise 45 108
no. redeployed in 2nd/3rd shift 2 5
no. released from enterprise 64 (51%) 120 (47%)
of whom no. retired 15 (23%) 34 (28%)
No. of workers released (inc.vacancies)
all enterorises in transport 585 640
no. redeployed in same enterprise 137 150
no. redeployed in 2nd/3rd shift 8 9
no. released from enterprise 386 (65%) 414 (64%)
of whom no. retired 121 (31%) 130 (31%)
No. of workers released (inc.vacancies)
all enterorises in communications 89 93
no. redeployed in same enterprise 19 20
no. redeployed in 2nd/3rd shift 0.2 0.2
no. released from enterprise 52 (58%) 55 (59%)
of whom no. retired 16 (30%) 16 (29%)
No. of workers released (inc.vacancies)
all enterorises in construction 470 595
no. redeployed in same enterprise 164 212
no. redeployed in 2nd/3rd shift 19 25
no. released from enterprise 249 (52%) 312 (52%)
of whom no. retired
No. of workers released (inc.vacancies)
40 (16%) 49 (15%)
all enterorises in local services 61 88
no. redeployed in same enterprise 19 29
no. redeployed in 2nd/3rd shift 0.8 2
no. released from enterprise 35 (57%) 48 (54%)
of whom no. retired 9 (2 5 %) 
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Ekonomicheskaia nauki no.3 1984.
2. The turnover rate for industry in 1987 was 12%. Trud v SSSR. Moscow 1988, p258. 
It is reported that 25 million workers change jobs every year. See A.Nikitin, "Kak pomoch’ 
bezrabotnomu", Pravda 6.4.90.
3. see interview with Shcherbakov in Ekonomika i zhizn' no.24 1990, pp4-5. Estimates of 
vacancies vary; if those in the second and third shift are included the number is much 
greater.
4. I.E.Zaslavskii, "Obespechenie zaniatosti v usloviiakh perestroiki", Rabochii klass i 
sovremmennvi mir. 1988, no.5.
5. The labour force participation rate was 82% in 1987. Trud v SSSR p9.
6. L.Chizhova, "Regulirovanie zaniatosti naseleniia", Planovoe khoziaistvo. no.8, 1988.
7. For discussion of this see "Pogolovnaia zaniatost’ i rynok truda", interview with Prof. 
S Otsu and Prof. V.Kostakov, conducted by M.Berger in Izvestiia. 11 Jan 1989, p7.
8. This usually refers mainly to people working on private agricultural plots or bringing 
up children at home. In 1988 there were 13.3 million nezaniatye, of whom about 8 million 
came under the above categories. (See Appendix 1). According to Trud v SSSR p4, 
between 1961 and 1970, 15 million workers were "drawn" from this "reserve" to cover 
state labour demand.
9. See the resolution in Izvestiia TsK KPSS. no.5 1989 pp27-32 "O privlechenii k 
obshchestvenno poleznomu trudu nezaniatoi chasti trudosposobnogo naseleniia v soyuznykh 
i avtonomnykh respublikakh Srednei Azii, Zakavkaz’ia i Severnogo Kavkaza" 
Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK KPSS, 31 March 1986. This gives figures for the 
nezanvatve population in Central Asia and the North Caucases in 1984, which have been 
since been reported in the west as figures for the "unemployed" in these regions. See for 
example "Reality of unemployment now recognised", Social and Labour Bulletin, 3-4, 1989, 
p301.
10. A study of displacement in the Bashkir region is often quoted. This gives an annual 
rate of 1% for 1968. A.Aitov, Tekhnicheskii progress i dvizhenie rabochikh kadrov. 
Moscow, 1972, p21. Similar estimates are made in A.J.Pietsch, H.Vogel, ’Displacement by 
Technological Progress in the USSR’, in J.Adam (ed), Employment Policies in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. London, 1982, ppl47-150; and D.Granick, Job Rights in the 
Soviet Union: Their Consequences. CUP, 1987, ppl24-127. For the 1986-90 planned 
figures, see E.Afanas’ev, O.Medvedeva, ’Organizatsionno-pravovye voprosy 




























































































11. Chizhova 1988; T.Zaslavskaia, "Chelovecheskii faktor razvitiia ekonomiki i sotsial’naia 
spravedlivost’", Kommunist. no. 13, 1986, pp61-73 and "Ekonomika skvoz’ prizmu 
sotsiologii”, EKO no.7, 1985, pp3-22.
12. This contradiction is discussed at length in P.A.Hauslohner, "Managing the Soviet 
Labour Market: Politics and Policymaking under Brezhnev", unpublished PhD Thesis, 
University of Michegan, 1984.
13. see A.Helgeson, "Geographical Mobility - Its Implications for Employment", in D.Lane 
(ed), Labour and Employment in the USSR. Wheatsheaf 1986.
14. For example, a director of one Moscow factory stated that only 80% of the potential 
of each worker is used at his factory. V.Parfenov, in Pravda. 20 May 1985, p3. It has been 
claimed that 15-20% of an enterprise’s workforce represents hidden reserves. See I.Maslova 
"Sovershenstovanie mekhanizma pereraspredeleniia rabochei sily", Voprosv ekonomiki no.7, 
1982. Kostakov, in Izvestiia. 11.1.89, claims that these reserves amount to 10 million; 
E.Babak, "Zashchita ot bezrabotitsy", Ekonomika i zhizn’ no. 15 1990, puts the figure at 
8-10 million. It is not however clear how this surplus is calculated.
15. see P.Rutland "The Shchekino Method and the Struggle to Raise Labour Productivity 
in Soviet Industry", Soviet Studies vol XXXVI, no.3 1984. Such experiments basically 
aimed at giving the enterprise an incentive to release workers by allowing it to keep and 
redistribute among the remaining workforce a percentage of any savings in the wage fund 
made by releasing workers. They usually had a limited success due to the so-called "ratchet 
effect", whereby the short term rewards of releasing workers were outweighed by the long 
term effect of the manpower plan in the following plan period being calculated on the basis 
of the reduced number of workers required to fulfill the output target in the base period.
16. See S.Malle, "Soviet Labour-Saving Policy in the Eighties", Nato Economic 
Colloquium, Brussels, April 1987.
17. J.Chapman, "Gorbachev’s Wage Reform, Soviet Economy, vol.4, no.4, 1988. See also 
the articles in Sotsialisticheskii trud no.l 1987.
18. see S.Oxenstiema, From Labour Shortage to Unemployment? The Soviet Labour Market 
in the 1980s. Almquist and Wicksell, Stockholm 1990, chapter 10.
19. "Relative releasing" refers to productivity gains obtained from installed capacity, while 
"conditional releasing" refers to productivity gains as a result of the introduction of labour- 
saving technology, i.e. an increase in production capacity. "Absolute freeing" takes place 
when the planned future employment is lower than employment in the base plan year; 
when the labour required for the new plan output target is lower than the labour needed 
for the fulfillment of the output target in the base period.
20. for an extensive discussion of this, see S.Malle, Employment Planning in the Soviet 
Union. Continuity and Change. Macmillan 1990.
21. Babak 1990, is the most recent example. See also E.Manevich, "Ratsional’nee 




























































































22. Article 17 of the (1970) Fundamentals of Labour Law, Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta 
SSSR, 1970, no.29. Article 33 of the RSFSR Labour Code (The Labour Codes of the 
other Republics have corresponding articles), in Kommentarii k zakonodatel’stvu o trude. 
Moscow 1981, p58.
23. Article 33, RSFSR Labour Code, Kommentarii... 1981, p68.
24. Points 42 and 43, Article 33, RSFSR Labour Code. Kommentarii....1981, p69.
25. Kodeks zakonov o trude RSFSR. Ministerstvo iustitsii RSFSR, Moscow 1988, art.40.
26. ibid. pp20-21.
27. cf M.Emerson "Regulation or Deregulation of the Labour Market", European Economic 
Review. 32 (1988), 775-817.
28. Normativnve aktv po isporzovaniiu trudovvkh resursov. 1972 pp499-508; for later 
statutes on the organisationa and operation of the JPBs, see Biulleten’ Goskomtrud SSSR. 
1979, no.8, pp6-9; ibid. 1981, no.3, pp3-6.
29. see J.Chapman "The Soviet Employment Service and the Search for Efficiency" 
Working Paper no. 177, Report to the National Council on Soviet and East European 
Research, December 1984; and interview with E.Afanas’ev, Argumentv i faktv. no45, 1989.
30. Malle 1987
31. Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers and the 
VTsSPS, "Ob obespechenii effektivnoi zaniatosti naseleniia sovershentsvovanii sistemy 
trudoustroistva i uslinenii sotsial’nykh garantii dlya trudiashchikhsia", Pravda. 19 January 
1988.
32. for more detail see I.S.Maslova, Ekonomicheskie voprosv pereraspredeleniia rabochei 
silv pri sotsializme. Moscow, Nauka, 1976.
33. There are currently 11,000 JPB employees for the whole country, see E.Babak, 1990; 
V.Gimpel’son and N.Rogovskii, "Vozmozhno li u nas bezrabotitsa", Moskovskaia pravda. 
25.4.90
34. A recent article describes the problems of the buros in Latvia; there is no reason to 
suppose that they are untypical for the rest of the country. See S.Blazhevich 
"Trudoustroistvo v usloviiakh ekonomicheskoi samostoiatel’nosti respubliki", 
Sotsialisticheskii trud. no.2, 1990.
35. ibid
36. a recent article claims that almost one-third of the metal-cutting machines and presses 
in Moscow are over 20 years old. "Vozmozhna li u nas bezrabotitsa", V.Gimpel’son and 
N.Rogovskii, Moskovskaia pravda. 24.4.90





























































































38. Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1988g. 1988, p58
39. E.Zaslavskii 1988. The average duration is reported to be 4-6 months. Some skilled 
workers are also affected.
40. ibid
41. see Afanas’ev in Areumentv i faktv no.45, 1989; D.J.Peterson, "New Data Published 
on Employment and Unemployment in the USSR”, Report on the USSR. Radio Liberty, 
January 5 1990.
42. Report on social and economic development in Ekonomika i zhizn’. no.32, 1990.
43. see E.Babak 1990
44. ibid; "Ne mogu nauti raboty", interview with A.Tille, Komsomol’skaia pravda. 13.9.89
45. Kostakov quotes the official "Basic Guidelines for the Development of the Economy 
up til the year 2000", which state that the rate of growth of labour productivity should 
increase by 2.3-2.5 times, implying an increase of 6 .0 -6 .5%. He interprets this as meaning 
that the numbers employed in material production should decrease by 13-20%, roughly the 
equivalent of 13-19 million people. Aganbegyan has claimed that by the year 2000 15- 
20% of all workers and collective farmers will be engaged in manual labour instead of 45- 
50% as is now the case. A.Aganbegyan, Excerpts from a broadcast on Soviet television, 
11 December 1987, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), SU/0031/C/2 21 
December 1987.
Others have mentioned figures of 16 million to be released by the year 2000 (Interview 
with I.Prostyakov, Deputy Chairman of the Buro for Social Development of the USSR 
Council of Ministers, Pravda. 21 January 1988, and SWB SU/0056/C/1 23 January 1988; 
Y.Leonteva "At the Cadre Crossroads", Sotsialisticheskaia industriia 19 January 1988 and 
SWB SU/0056 C/3.); or 12-18 million from the production sphere, an average of at least
1.2 million each year (see E.Babak, 1990; this is apparently refers to a Gosplan estimate.) 
Kolosov, of Goskomtrud, has claimed that 50 million workers will change jobs or 
experience a period of unemployment in the next 10 years. See report in Sole 24 Ore 
30.3.90.
46. Afanas’ev, Argumentv i faktv. no.45, 1989; Shcherbakov, 1990. Estimates and 
calculation of vacancies vary considerably. These figures suggest that the trend is still 
towards growing labour shortages, but should not be taken as the definitive figures for 
vacancies.
47. G.Grossman "Roots of Gorbachev’s Problems: Private Income and Outlay in the late 
1970s" in Gorbachev’s Economic Plans. JEC Washington 1987, pp213-229.
48. Nar.khoz. 1988, p33.
49. Zakon SSSR "O kooperatsii v SSSR", May 26, 1988; Ekonomicheskaia gazeta. no.24, 
1988.




























































































51. The average monthly wage of coop workers in 1989 was reported to be 500 roubles; 
that of state industrial employees 240.8 roubles. Ekonomika i zhizn’ no6 1990, and 
Nar.khoz. 1988 p377.
52. Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1988g. p33.
53. Figures quoted by Kirichenko, Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, 
in Moscow News, no. 12, 1990, plO.
54. Ekonomika i zhizn’. no. 18, 1990
55. F.R.Filippov; "Sotsial’nye garantii effektivnoi zaniatosti", Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia. 
no.5, 1988
56. see V.Kosmarskii, "Vysvobodzhenie rabotnikov: nereshenye problemy", Khoziaistvo i 
pravo. no. 10, 1989.
57. Filippov, 1988; Argumentv i faktv no.45. 1989
58. In Moscow 25 Ministries have been eliminated as well as 2,500 middle-level 
administrative "organs", and staff reduced by 70,000. In the Republics 152 Ministries were 
eliminated, and in the Autonomous Republics 192. Staff was reduced by 620,000. "Rabochii 
i rynok", interview with L.I.Abalkin and V.I.Shcherbakov, Ekonomika i zhizn’. no.17, 1990.
59. see Trud v SSSR. pp3—31; also "Moskovskii bezrabotnyi - uvy, reaTnost’", 
Moskovskaia pravda: 7.6.90.
60. S.Rapawy, "Labour Force and Employment in the USSR", Gorbachev’s Economic 
Plans, vol.l, Joint Economic Committee (ed), Washington DC 1987, pl90.
61. In September 1989 the figure was reported as 43 million. See Statisticheskii press 
biulleten’ no.9, 1989, pl29
62. This and following information taken from Ekonomika i zhizn’. no 18, 1990, pl4.
63. Ekonomika i zhizn’ no.18, 1990, p 15
64. see the new pension law published in Izvestiia 30.5.1990.
65. Pravda 4.1.83
66. Social and Labour Bulletin 3-4 1989, p235; see also Margot Jacobs "Soviet Pensioners 
Finally Get a Boost", Radio Liberty Report on the USSR. 10 August 1990.
67. ibid; according to Argumentv i faktv no45, 1989, the figure was 7.9 million
68. Jacobs 1990
69. The minimum wage established in 1972 is 70 roubles; Ekonomika i zhizn’. no 18, 
1990, p6. However 75 roubles is now reportedly recognised as the poverty line, with 36 
million having incomes below this level; see Social and Labour Bulletin 3-4 1989; 78 




























































































70. T.Pulatov, "Is Democracy a Burden on the Poor?", Moscow News. nol9, 1990.
71. Moscow News, no.26, 1990, p 13.
72. Izvestiia TsK KPSS no.5 1989.
73. this is repeated in Nar.khoz. 1988. p33. A figure of 6 million nezaniatve is given for 
the country as a whole.
74. Izvestiia TsK KPSS no.5 1989
75. Filippov, 1988.
76. Komsomolskaia pravda. 13.9.89
77. Molodezh’ SSSR. Goskomstat, Moscow 1990, pl41
78. Izvestiia TsK KPSS no.5. 1989.
79. A.Nikitin, "Kak pomoch’ bezrabotnomu", Pravda. 6.4.90; and E.Babak, 1990. The Trade 
Unions have also drawn up their version of the draft employment act, see Trud 15.6.90.
80. for information on minimum pension see Statisticheskii press biulleten’. no.9, 1989 and 
Social and Labour Bulletin. 3-4, 1989, p235
81. see J.Micklewright, "The Reform of Unemployment Compensation: Choices for East 
and West", Invited Paper presented at European Economic Association Annual Congress, 
Lisbon, 1990.
82. This view is the one that has been put forward by specialists in the past, and is still 
held by some, such as Kotlyar, head of the research institute of the RSFSR Goskomtrud. 
See report by E.Babak, 1990. See also the discussion in "Pravo na poluchenie raboty", 
Voprosv ekonomiki. no.2, 1989.
83. L.Kunel’skii, "Bezrabotitsa? U nas?” Ekonomicheskaia gazeta. no.36, 1989.






























































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge -  depending on the availability of
stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy
From Name . .
Address
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1990/91





































































































Working Papers of the Department of Economics 
Published since 1989
8 9 /3 7 0
B. BENSAID/ R J. GARY-BOBO/
S. FEDERBUSCH
The Strategic Aspects of Profit Sharing in the 
Industry
8 9 /3 7 4
Francisco S. TORRES
Small Countries and Exogenous Policy Shocks 
8 9 /3 7 5
Renzo DAVIDDI
Rouble Convertibility: A Realistic Target 
8 9 /3 7 7
Elettra AGLIARDI
On the Robustness of Contestability Theory 
8 9 /3 7 8
Stephen MARTIN
The Welfare Consequences of Transaction Costs 
in Financial Markets
8 9 /3 8 1
Susan SENIOR NELLO
Recent Developments in Relations Between the
EC and Eastern Europe
8 9 /3 8 2
Jean GABSZEWICZ/ Paolo GARELLA/ 
Charles NOLLET
Spatial Price Competition With Uninformed 
Buyers
8 9 /3 8 3  
Benedetto GUI
Beneficiary and Dominant Roles in 
Organizations: The Case of Nonprofits
8 9 /3 8 4
Agustin MARAVALL/ Daniel PENA 
Missing Observations, Additive Outliers and 
Inverse Autocorrelation Function
8 9 /3 8 5
Stephen MARTIN
Product Differentiation and Market Performance 
in Oligopoly
8 9 /3 8 6  
Dalia MARIN
Is the Export-Led Growth Hypothesis Valid for 
Industrialized Countries?
8 9 /3 8 7
Stephen MARTIN
Modeling Oligopolistic Interaction
8 9 /3 8 8
Jean-Claude CHOURAQUI
The Conduct of Monetary Policy: What have we
Learned From Recent Experience
8 9 /3 9 0
Corrado BENASSI
Imperfect Information and Financial Markets: A 
General Equilibrium Model
8 9 /3 9 4
Serge-Christophe KOLM 
Adequacy, Equity and Fundamental Dominance: 
Unanimous and Comparable Allocations in 
Rational Social Choice, with Applications to 
Marriage and Wages
8 9 /3 9 5
Daniel HEYMANN/ Axel LEUONHUFVUD 
On the Use of Currency Reform in Inflation 
Stabilization
8 9 /4 0 0
Robert J. GARY-BOBO
On the Existence of Equilibrium Configurations 
in a Class of Asymmetric Market Entry Games *
8 9 /4 0 2
Stephen MARTIN
Direct Foreign Investment in The United States 
8 9 /4 1 3
Francisco S. TORRES
Portugal, the EMS and 1992: Stabilization and 
Liberalization
8 9 /4 1 6
Joerg MAYER
Reserve Switches and Exchange-Rate Variability: 
The Presumed Inherent Instability o f the 
Multiple Reserve-Currency System
8 9 /4 1 7
José P. ESPERANÇA/ Neil KAY 
Foreign Direct Investment and Competition in 
the Advertising Sector: The Italian Case



























































































8 9 /4 1 8
Luigi BRIGHI/ Mario FORNI
Aggregation Across Agents in Demand Systems
8 9 /4 2 0
Corrado BENASSI
A Competitive Model of Credit Intermediation 
8 9 /4 2 2
Marcus MILLER/ Mark SALMON 
When does Coordination pay?
8 9 /4 2 3
Marcus MILLER/ Mark SALMON/
Alan SUTHERLAND
Time Consistency, Discounting and the Returns 
to Cooperation
8 9 /4 2 4
Frank CRITCHLEY/ Paul MARRIOTT/
Mark SALMON
On the Differential Geometry of the Wald Test 
with Nonlinear Restrictions
8 9 /4 2 5
Peter J. HAMMOND
On the Impossibility of Perfect Capital Markets 
8 9 /4 2 6
Peter J. HAMMOND
Perfected Option Markets in Economies with 
Adverse Selection
8 9 /4 2 7
Peter J. HAMMOND
Irreducibility, Resource Relatedness, and Survival 
with Individual Non-Convexities
EC O  No. 9 0 /1"
Tamer BA§AR and Made SALMON 
Credibility and the Value of Information 
Transmission in a Model of Monetary Policy 
and Inflation
ECO  No. 90/2
Horst UNGERER
The EMS -  The First Ten Years
Policies -  Developments -  Evolution
ECO  No. 90/3 
Peter J. HAMMOND
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and 
how they are and should be made
ECO  No. 90/4 
Peter J. HAMMOND
A Revelation Principle for (Boundedly) Bayesian 
Rationalizable Strategies
ECO  No. 90/5 
Peter J. HAMMOND 
Independence of Irrelevant Interpersonal 
Comparisons
ECO  No. 90/6 
Hal R. VARIAN
A Solution to the Problem of Externalities and 
Public Goods when Agents are Well-Informed
ECO  No. 90/7 
Hal R. VARIAN
Sequential Provision of Public Goods 
ECO  No. 90/8
T. BRIANZA, L. PHLIPS and J.F. RICHARD 
Futures Markets, Speculation and Monopoly 
Pricing
ECO  No. 90/9
Anthony B. ATKINSON/John
MICKLEWRIGHT
Unemployment Compensation and Labour 
Market Transition: A Critical Review
ECO  No. 90/10
Peter J. HAMMOND
The Role of Information in Economics
EC O  No. 90/11
Nicos M. CHRISTODOULAKIS 
Debt Dynamics in a Small Open Economy
EC O  No. 90/12 
Stephen C. SMITH
On the Economic Rationale for Codetermination 
Law
ECO  No. 90/13 
Elettra AGLIARDI
Learning by Doing and Market Structures
ECO  No. 90/14 
Peter J. HAMMOND 
Intertemporal Objectives
ECO  No. 90/15 
Andrew EVANS/Stephen MARTIN 
Socially Acceptable Distortion of Competition: 
EC Policy on State Aid
Please note: As from January 1990, the EUI 
Working Papers Series is divided into six sub-series, each 
series will be numbered individually (e.g. EUI Working 
Paper LAW No. 90/1).



























































































EC O  No. 90/16 
Stephen MARTIN 
Fringe Size and Cartel Stability
E C O  No. 90/17
John MICKLE WRIGHT
Why Do Less Than a Quarter of the
Unemployed in Britain Receive Unemployment
Insurance?
E C O  No. 90/18 
Mrudula A. PATEL 
Optimal Life Cycle Saving 
With Borrowing Constraints:
A Graphical Solution
E C O  No. 90/19 
Peter J. HAMMOND
Money Metric Measures of Individual and Social 
Welfare Allowing for Environmental 
Externalities
EC O  No. 90/20 
Louis PHLIPS/
Ronald M. HARSTAD
Oligopolistic Manipulation of Spot Markets and 
the Timing of Futures Market Speculation
ECO  No. 90/21
Christian DUSTMANN
Earnings Adjustment of Temporary Migrants
EC O  No. 90/22
John MICKLEWRIGHT
The Reform of Unemployment Compensation:
Choices for East and West
ECO  No. 90/23 
Joerg MAYER
U. S. Dollar and Deutschmark as Reserve Assets
EC O  No. 90/24 
Sheila MARNIE
Labour Market Reform in the USSR:
Fact or Fiction?
Working Paper out o f print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
^t
tr
uT
o
.^5* 17̂
03
d
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
